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8.1  Introduction 
Many governments encourage the development and use of new technologies 
within the borders of their countries. It is not difficult to understand why they 
do so. It is widely believed that the positive correlation between local eco- 
nomic affluence and the presence of  technologically advanced industries im- 
plies that the use of new technologies enhances overall productivity. More di- 
rect evidence generally supports the conclusion that the economic benefits of 
research and development (R&D) activity extend to local firms other than 
those undertaking the R&D.' Since there are reasons to expect that externality- 
generating R&D activities may be underprovided by markets in which devel- 
opers of new technologies do not capture all of the economic benefits that the 
technologies provide, various governments offer R&D-related tax subsidies.2 
Governments that do not offer R&D tax subsidies are often concerned that 
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1. See Griliches (1991) and Nadiri (1993) for surveys of empirical measures of productivity 
spillovers from R&D activities. 
2. In theory, the welfare consequences of subsidizing R&D are ambiguous because competitive 
pressures might generate too much R&D in certain industries in the absence of  a subsidy and 
because foreign competitors may benefit from domestic subsidies (or in other ways influence the 
domestic market). See Dixit (1988) and Reinganum (1989) for surveys of the theory. The United 
States introduced the research and experimentation tax credit, and increased the tax deductibility 
of the R&D expenses of certain multinational corporations, in the Economic Recovery Bx  Act of 
198  1. This legislation appears to have been motivated by consideration of economic externalities, 
though the focus of congressional sentiment as described in U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation 
(1981) is on comparisons of U.S. research intensity with the research intensities of other countries. 
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perhaps they should. There are, however, many open questions about the im- 
pact of tax policy on the level of R&D. 
Tax systems influence the level and content of R&D activity through a vari- 
ety of channels. This paper focuses on R&D by multinational firms, and on the 
impact of one particular set of taxes: withholding taxes on cross-border royalty 
payments.  Firms that develop new technologies in their home countries and 
use the technologies  in foreign locations are required  to pay royalties  from 
foreign affiliates to domestic parent companies. Governments tax these royalty 
payments. High tax rates make royalties, and the technology imports that they 
accompany, more expensive for the foreign affiliates that pay the taxes. 
In theory, higher costs of imported technology might encourage or discour- 
age local R&D by  affiliates of  multinational  corporations.  If  local R&D is 
complementary with imported technology, then high royalty tax rates should 
discourage local R&D, while if local R&D is a substitute for imported technol- 
ogy, then high royalty tax rates should encourage local R&D. 
This paper has two objectives. The first is to identify the degree to which 
R&D activity by  multinational firms is sensitive to local tax conditions. The 
second objective is to determine whether imported technology and local R&D 
are complements or substitutes. 
The results suggest that R&D responds significantly to local tax rates, and 
that local R&D is a substitute for imported technology. These results appear 
both in the behavior of American investors in other countries and in the behav- 
ior of  foreign  investors in  the United  States. Firms appear to react  to  high 
royalty tax rates by  paying  fewer royalties  and performing  additional R&D 
locally. To the extent that royalty payments reflect actual technology transfer 
(rather than  adept accounting practices), the behavior of  multinational firms 
implies that local R&D is a substitute for imported technology. 
Section 8.2 of the paper briefly describes the tax treatment of multinational 
firms, paying particular attention to technology-related issues. Section 8.3 de- 
scribes a simple model of firm behavior that traces the link between taxation 
and the degree of complementarity  or substitutability of  local R&D and im- 
ported  technology.  Section 8.4 describes  the data that  serve as the basis  of 
the empirical work. Section 8.5 presents evidence on the relationship between 
royalty tax rates in foreign countries and the R&D intensities of local affiliates 
of American multinational firms. Section 8.6 examines the same relationship 
for foreign firms investing in the United States. Section 8.7 is the conclusion. 
8.2  Multinational Firms, Taxation, and International Technology 
Transfer 
This section examines the role of multinational firms in international tech- 
nology transfer and reviews the tax treatment of R&D expenditures and royalty 
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8.2.1  International Technology Transfer 
There is considerable interest in understanding the role that multinational 
firms play in transferring technologies across borders. There are two methods 
by  which  multinational firms provide  new technologies to the countries in 
which they invest. The first method  is to develop new technologies  locally, 
through R&D or other similar types of activity. The second method is to import 
technologies produced elsewhere. 
The foreign affiliates of American firms use both methods to bring techno- 
logies to the countries in which they operate, and there exists sufficient infor- 
mation to assess quantitatively the relative significance of each method. Direct 
information  on the R&D activities of the foreign affiliates of  U.S. firms is 
reported in surveys conducted by the U.S. Commerce Department. Information 
on technology imports by these affiliates is considerably sketchier. One can, 
however, infer the approximate magnitude of technology imports from royal- 
ties paid by the affiliates to U.S. parent firms and third parties in other coun- 
tries,  since royalty payments should, in principle, reflect the values of  im- 
ported technologies. 
Table  8.1  reports  detailed  information  about  the  aggregate technology- 
related behavior of the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms in 1982 and 1989. It is 
noteworthy that these affiliates paid more in royalties to their parent firms ($9.8 
billion in 1989) than they spent on R&D ($7.9 billion in 1989), though, as the 
table indicates, there was extensive use of both methods of technology acquisi- 
tion. The survey distinguishes two categories of R&D expenditure: R&D by 
affiliates for themselves and R&D by affiliates for others (the latter of which 
is R&D performed on a contract basis). R&D by affiliates for themselves con- 
stitutes roughly 80 percent of their total R&D expenditures. 
American firms spend a considerable amount of money on R&D performed 
in foreign countries, but in recent years, foreign-owned firms in the United 
States have spent even more than that on R&D performed here. Figure 8.1 
illustrates the R&D expenditure levels of  foreign affiliates of U.S. firms and 
foreign-owned firms in the United States over the 1977-90 period. Due to the 
R&D intensity of  the U.S. economy relative to the rest of the world, and the 
strength of foreign direct investment into the United States since 1973, foreign 
firms have spent more on R&D inside the United States than American firms 
have spent on R&D outside the United States in every year since 1982, and the 
gap between the two expenditure levels is widening (see fig. 8.1).3 
There is considerable interest in the role of multinational firms in transfer- 
3. Exchange rate fluctuations can confound the interpretation of fig. 8.1 since changes in the 
value of the dollar relative to foreign currencies affect the dollar-denominated relative magnitudes 
of R&D performed in the United States and abroad, even if nominal expenditures are unchanged. 
This consideration is not significant in this case, however, since a simple adjustment for the chang- 
ing value of  the dollar relative to a trade-weighted average of foreign currencies produces a figure 
that very closely resembles fig. 8.1. 228  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 8.1  R&D and Royalty Activity of Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Multinationals 
Activity  1982  1989 
R&D expenditures, total 
By affiliate for itself 
By affiliate for others 
Royalty receipts, total 
From U.S. parents 
From other foreign affiliates 
From unaffiliated Americans 
From unaffiliated foreigners 
To  U.S. parents 
To  other foreign affiliates 
To  unaffiliated Americans 
To  unaffiliated foreigners 



























Source: U.S. Department of  Commerce (1985, 1992). 
Note; Amounts are millions of current dollars. Data cover majority-owned foreign affiliates of 
U.S.  multinational firms. 
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Fig. 8.1 
abroad, 1977-90 
Sources: U.S.  Department of Commerce (various issues); National Science Foundation (1993). 
Note: The vertical scale measures billions of current dollars of annual R&D expenditures. Darkly 
shaded bars represent total R&D expenditures of foreign-owned firms in the United States. Lightly 
shaded bars represent total R&D expenditures of foreign affiliates of American firms. 
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ring technology across borders, and the impact that government policy can 
have on the rate and direction of technology transfer. Though these issues have 
been extensively studied:  one of  the open questions is the degree to which 
imported technology is a substitute or complement for local R&D. 
8.2.2  U.S. Taxation of Foreign Income5 
The United States taxes income on a “residence” basis, meaning that Ameri- 
can corporations and individuals owe taxes to the U.S. government on all of 
their worldwide income, whether earned in the United States or not. The top 
U.S. corporate tax rate is now 35 percent. Since foreign profits are usually 
taxed in host countries, U.S.  law provides a foreign tax credit for income taxes 
(and related taxes) paid to foreign governments, in order not to subject Ameri- 
can multinationals to double taxation. The foreign tax credit mechanism pro- 
vides that an American corporation earning $100 in a foreign country with a 
12 percent tax rate (and a foreign tax obligation of $12) pays only $23 to the 
U.S. government, since its U.S. corporate tax liability of  $35 (35 percent of 
$100) is reduced to $23 by the foreign tax credit of $12. The foreign tax credit 
is, however, limited to U.S. tax liability on foreign income; if, in the example, 
the foreign tax rate were 50 percent, then the firm  pays $50 to  the foreign 
government but its U.S. foreign tax credit is limited to $35. Hence, an Ameri- 
can firm receives full tax credits for its foreign taxes paid only when it is in a 
“deficit credit” position, i.e., when its average foreign tax rate is less than its 
tax rate on domestic operations. A firm has “excess credits” if its available 
foreign tax credits exceed U.S. tax liability on its foreign income. Firms aver- 
age together their taxable incomes and taxes paid in all of their foreign opera- 
tions in calculating their foreign tax credits and the foreign tax credit limit.6 
Deferral of  U.S. taxation of certain foreign earnings is another important 
feature of the US.  international tax system. An American parent firm is taxed 
on its subsidiaries’ foreign income only when returned (“repatriated”) to the 
4. See, e.g., Teece (1976). Gerrnidis (1977), Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo (1979). Mansfield 
and Romeo  (1980). Davidson and McFetridge (1984), Lipsey, Blomstrom,  and Kravis (1990). 
Zejan (1990), Blomstrom (1991). Ethier and Markusen (1991). Wang and Blomstrom (1992), and 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1993). These studies together consider the effect of a large number of 
variables on technology transfer and R&D activity, though they do not consider the effect of roy- 
alty tax rates on local R&D intensities. 
5. Parts of this brief description of the tax system are excerpted from Hines (1991). 
6.  In order to qualify for the foreign tax credit, firms must own at least 10 percent of a foreign 
affiliate, and only those taxes that qualify as income taxes are creditable. Furthermore, income is 
broken into different functional “baskets” in the calculation of  applicable credits and limits. In- 
come earned and taxes paid in the conduct of most types of active foreign business operations are 
grouped in one basket; petroleum industry income is grouped in a separate basket; and there are 
separate baskets for items such as passive income earned abroad. The basket distinctions imply 
that a firm might simultaneously have excess foreign tax credits in the petroleum basket (which is 
common, since foreign tax rates on oil income are typically quite high) and deficit foreign tax 
credits in the active income basket. Such a firm would have to pay  some U.S.  tax on its active 
foreign income, even though it has excess foreign tax credits on its petroleum income. 230  James R. Hines, Jr. 
parent corporation. This type of deferral is available only to foreign operations 
that are separately incorporated in foreign countries (“subsidiaries” of the par- 
ent) and not to consolidated (“branch”) operations. The U.S. government taxes 
branch profits as they are earned, just as it would profits earned within  the 
United States. 
The deferral of U.S. taxation may create incentives for firms with lightly 
taxed foreign earnings to delay repatriating dividends from their foreign sub- 
sidiaries.’ This incentive arises in those cases in which firms expect never to 
repatriate their foreign earnings, or in which they anticipate that future years 
will be more attractive for repatriation (either because domestic tax rates will 
be lower or because future sources of foreign income will generate excess for- 
eign tax credits that can be used to offset U.S.  tax liability on the dividends).* 
It appears that, in practice, American multinationals tend to pay dividends out 
of their more heavily taxed foreign earnings first.9 Consequently, the average 
tax rate that firms face on their foreign  income need  not exactly equal the 
average foreign tax rate faced by their branches and subsidiaries abroad. 
Branch earnings and dividends from subsidiaries represent only two forms 
of foreign income for U.S. income tax purposes. Interest received from foreign 
sources also represents foreign income, though  foreign  interest receipts are 
often classified within their own basket and hence are not averaged with other 
income  in calculating  the foreign tax credit. Royalty  income received  from 
foreigners, including foreign affiliates of U.S. firms, is also foreign-source in- 
come. Foreign governments often impose moderate taxes on dividend, interest, 
and royalty payments from foreign affiliates to their American parent compa- 
nies; these withholdinglo taxes are fully creditable against an American taxpay- 
er’s US. tax liability on foreign income. 
7. The incentive to defer repatriation of  lightly taxed subsidiary earnings is attenuated by  the 
Subpart F provisions, introduced into US.  law in 1962, that treat a subsidiary’s passive income, 
and income invested in U.S. property, as if  it were distributed to its American owners, thereby 
subjecting it to immediate U.S. taxation. The Subpart F rules apply to controlled foreign corpora- 
tions, which are foreign corporations  owned at least 50 percent by  American persons  holding 
stakes of at least 10 percent each. Controlled foreign corporations that reinvest their foreign earn- 
ings in active businesses can continue to defer their U.S. tax liability on those earnings. See Hines 
(1994a), Hines and Rice (1994). and Scholes and Wolfson (1992) for the behavioral implications 
of these rules. 
8. It is interesting to note that the deferral of U.S. tax liability does not itself create an incentive 
to delay paying dividends from foreign subsidiaries since the U.S.  tax must be paid eventually. See 
Hartman (1985). 
9. See the evidence presented in Hines and Hubbard (1990). 
10. Taxes on cross-border flows, such as dividends, interest, and royalties, are known as “with- 
holding” taxes because of  some of the specifics of their administration. Strictly speaking, these 
taxes represent obligations of  the recipients of  the cross-border  flows and not the payors; this 
arrangement permits immediate full crediting of withholding taxes by recipients who are eligible 
to claim foreign tax credits. The taxes are called “withholding” taxes because the local payor is 
the withholding agent for the tax and is therefore liable to its host government for full payment of 
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8.2.3  The Tax Treatment of R&D Expenditures and Royalty Receipts 
American multinational firms that perform R&D in the United States in- 
tending to use the resulting technology both in the United States and abroad 
face a complex tax treatment of  their transactions. Since passage of the Tax 
Reform Act of  1986, American multinationals are no longer allowed to deduct 
100 percent of their U.S. R&D expenses against their U.S. tax liabilities. In- 
stead, U.S. law requires American firms to allocate R&D expenses between 
U.S. and foreign source based on the fraction of a firm’s sales that are foreign.” 
The practical importance of  this system is that firms with excess foreign tax 
credits receive usable tax deductions for only a fraction (equal to the ratio of 
domestic sales to total worldwide sales) of  their U.S. R&D expenses. This 
system is based on  the idea that multinational firms performing R&D in the 
United States use only a fraction of the output of their R&D activities to en- 
hance their sales in the United States and, consequently, that only a fraction of 
their R&D costs should be deductible against U.S.-source income. 
Royalties received by American parent firms for R&D used abroad represent 
taxable foreign-source income of  the American firms. American firms with 
deficit foreign tax credits must pay U.S. income tax on these royalty receipts, 
while firms with excess foreign tax credits can apply the excess credits against 
U.S. taxes due on the royalties, thereby eliminating the U.S. tax liability cre- 
ated by the royalty receipts. 
Most of the world’s governments impose withholding taxes on cross-border 
royalty payments from affiliates located within their countries. These royalty 
tax rates are frequently reduced according to the terms of bilateral tax treaties. 
For example, the United States imposes a 30 percent tax on royalties paid to 
foreign corporations, but this tax rate is often reduced, in some cases to zero, 
when recipients of  royalty payments are located in countries with whom the 
United States has a tax treaty in force. 
8.3  Framework for Analysis 
This section analyzes the implications of systems of  international taxation 
for the R&D behavior of multinational firms. 
Consider a multinational firm that establishes a foreign affiliate to produce 
and sell goods in the foreign country in which the affiliate is located.12 The 
affiliate generates sales using local inputs of capital, labor, and intermediate 
products; in addition, the affiliate uses technology from its parent and the tech- 
nology it generates on its own to produce goods for sale. The reduced-form 
11. See Hines (1993,  1994bj for descriptions  of  the precise formulas used and quantitative 
assessments of their impact on R&D spending levels. 
12. This analysis abstracts from the possibility that the activities of a foreign affiliate directly 
enhance the sales of its domestic parent firm. One of the practical difficulties that American firms 
encounter in such situations is that royalties paid by  U.S.  parents to their foreign affiliates are 
severely tax disadvantaged. See Hines (1994b) for a discussion of this issue. 232  James R. Hines, Jr. 
function that describes the impact of technologies on the affiliate’s sales can 
be formalized as S(R, R*, $), in which S denotes sales in the local (foreign) 
market, R is technology provided by the parent firm to the affiliate in this mar- 
ket, R*  is the technology that the affiliate generates on its own, and $ denotes 
other features of  the local market (as well as the affiliate’s profit-maximizing 
employment of local factors). 
American tax law  and the tax  laws of  most other countrie~’~  require that 
foreign affiliates pay rents or royalties to their parent firms for the fair market 
value of  technologies transferred from the parent firms to the affiliates. Of 
course, in practice it is frequently difficult to establish the fair market value of 
technology transferred from one party to another within a controlled group 
since there may exist no market prices for the types of technology in question. 
In  such circumstances, tax-avoiding firms that transfer technology from the 
parent to its foreign affiliates often have incentives to select royalty payments 
that transfer taxable income out of high-tax jurisdictions and into low-tax juris- 
dictions. Governments are aware of this incentive and try to use their enforce- 
ment power to prevent royalties from deviating too greatly from reasonable 
values.14 
One way to describe government enforcement efforts is to introduce an addi- 
tional cost that firms bear when royalties deviate from market values. The cost 
includes the cost that firms incur in justifying their royalty declarations to tax 
authorities. If this adjustment cost rises sufficiently with the size of the devia- 
tion of reported royalties from market values, it will ultimately limit the degree 
to which firms modify royalty payments simply for tax purposes. 
A quadratic model of  adjustment costs provides a convenient framework 
to use in analyzing the impact of  government enforcement efforts. One can 
distinguish R, the true value of  transferred technology, from I;  the royalty paid 
to the parent firm by  the affiliate receiving the technology. If the rate of adjust- 
ment cost is quadratic in the deviation of declared royalties from the technolo- 
gy’s market value, then adjustment costs equal a[(R -  r)VR2]  for each unit of 
technology transferred. The parameter 01  is taken to be constant. Total adjust- 
ment costs equal the product of R and this term, or a(R -  r)*/R. 
The affiliate’s technology-related taxable income represents the difference 
between sales revenue generated by  the technology and the affiliate’s costs. 
These costs include the affiliate’s own R&D expenditures, the royalties it pays 
to the parent firm, and the adjustment cost.15 The parent firm receives a royalty 
13. Of the 25 industrialized countries surveyed by  Lawlor (1985), 24 apply the arm’s-length 
principle to the taxation of related-party transactions; Hong Kong is the lone exception. 
14. For evidence on the overall effectiveness of transfer price enforcement, see Kopits (1976), 
Grubert and Mutti (1991), Harris et al. (1993). and Hines and Rice (1994). 
15. This treatment of  the foreign affiliate abstracts from its activities that are unaffected by 
R&D activities or technology imports. The affiliate, and not the parent firm, is assumed to bear 
the adjustment cost because doing so simplifies the algebra that follows. A more general treatment 
that allocates adjustment costs between affiliates and parent firms yields qualitatively similar re- 
sults. See e.g., the treatment of adjustment costs in Hines and Rice (1994). 233  Taxes, Technology Transfer,  and R&D by  Multinational Firms 
from its affiliate and may incur a cost of producing the technology that it trans- 
fers to the affiliate. In order to fix ideas for the analysis that follows, the model 
describes the behavior of a multinational firm that has excess foreign tax cred- 
its and that values on a one-for-one basis its after-tax profits in foreign subsidi- 
aries.I6  The multinational firm maximizes after-tax profits, IT: 
(1)  IT  = (1 -  T*)[S(R,  R*, +) -  R* -  r -  a(R -  r)VR] 
in which T* is the foreign statutory tax rate, w*  is the withholding tax rate 
imposed by the foreign government on outgoing royalty payments, and c is the 
per unit cost incurred by the parent firm to develop andor transfer the technol- 
ogy represented by  R. The first term in expression (1)  represents the after- 
foreign-tax profits earned by the affiliate; the second term is the parent firm’s 
after-withholding-tax royalty receipts; and the third term is the parent firm’s 
cost of developing the technology that it transfers to the affiliate. In some cases, 
parent firms costlessly transfer to their subsidiaries technologies developed for 
other purposes, so it is possible that c = 0. 
+ (1 -  w*)r -  cR, 
The first-order condition describing the firm’s optimal choice of r is 
(2)  (1 -  7*)[2a(R -  r)/R -  13 + (1 -  w*) = 0, 
which yields 
(3) 
The first-order condition describing the firm’s optimal choice of R is 
r = R(1 + (7* -  w*)/[2a(l -  7*)]}. 
(4)  (1 -  +)[as/aR -  a(~  -  r)(~  + ~)/RZ]  -  = 0. 
Imposing equation (3) and simplfying yields 
(5)  asm = c/(i -  7*)  + (w*  -  ?*)/(I -  7*)  -  (w* -  7  *  )  2 /[4a(l -  7*)’]. 
The first-order condition describing the firm’s optimal choice of R* is consider- 
ably simpler: 
(6)  as/aR* = 1. 
16. A firm values its subsidiaries’ profits on a one-for-basis either if there is no tax due upon 
repatriation or if the firm can use deferral strategies of the type described in Hines and Rice (1994) 
to reduce the present value of repatriation taxes. A firm with deficit foreign tax credits maximizes 
an expression that is similar to equation (I), with the difference that the terms 1 -  T* and 1 -  w* 
are replaced by  1 -  T, in which T  is the home country tax rate. The first-order conditions describing 
the behavior of  such a firm imply that the firm sets r = R, and that, in this static setting, host 
country tax rates do not influence its behavior. In practice, the behavior of American multinational 
firms should reflect some kind of average of these two extremes. The analysis that follows assumes 
that all American firms have excess foreign tax credits, so, to the extent that many firms do not, 
the empirical estimates understare the responsiveness of the affected group to local tax conditions. 
The home countries of foreign investors in the United States have tax systems that differ consider- 
ably  in  their treatments  of  R&D expenditures  and royalty and dividend income  from foreign 
sources. The empirical work in this paper distinguishes home-country tax systems only by whether 
firms are permitted to  claim foreign tax credits, which omits some more subtle distinctions and 
may, thereby, introduce measurement error in the tax variables. 234  James R.  Hines, Jr. 
The conditions (3), (3,  and (6) characterize the multinational firm’s optimal 
interior choices of  R, R*, and r Inspection of  equations (5) and (6) indicates 
that taxation does not affect the required marginal productivity of  R&D per- 
formed in the foreign location, while taxation does affect the required marginal 
productivity of R&D performed in the home country. Consequently, as long as 
tax rates are set in a manner that is exogenous to the unobservable factors that 
determine R&D intensity, it is possible to use the tax variables that appear on 
the right-hand side of  equation (5) to estimate the extent to which domestic 
technology is a substitute or complement for foreign R&D. 
8.4  Data 
There are two available sources of detailed information on the R&D activi- 
ties of  multinational firms located in a large number of  countries. The first 
source is the 1989 Benchmark Survey of  the Bureau of  Economic Analysis 
(BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. This survey, the results of which 
are reported in U.S. Department of Commerce (1992), is the most recent com- 
prehensive survey of the activities of the foreign affiliates of American multi- 
national firms. The survey covers activities during 1989. In order to protect the 
confidentiality of survey respondents, BEA does not divulge the responses of 
individual firms  and  reports country aggregates only for those countries in 
which there are sufficient numbers of U.S. firms with sizable activities that ag- 
gregate figures do not reveal information about individual firms. Useful R&D 
and royalty data are available for affiliates in 43 foreign countries for 1989. 
The second source of information is the 1987 survey of foreign direct invest- 
ment in the United States, reported in U.S. Department of Commerce (1990). 
This survey describes the activities of foreign-owned firms in the United States 
during 1987. Because of data suppressions and other limitations, useful data 
are available on investors from 27 different countries during 1987. 
The goal of the statistical work is to examine the relationship between roy- 
alty tax rates and levels of R&D activity, both for American firms investing in 
foreign countries and for foreign firms investing in the United States. The dif- 
ficulty that such a study encounters is that R&D levels differ for reasons that 
have nothing to do with tax rates. One nontax factor that is clearly associated 
with R&D spending is the degree of R&D intensity in the countries in which 
multinational firms have operations. The foreign affiliates of American multi- 
nationals located in countries whose economies are R&D intensive tend to 
perform more R&D than do affiliates located in other countries. Similarly, 
foreign-owned affiliates in the United States tend to invest more in R&D if 
their parent firms are located in technologically intensive countries.” 
17. At a first pass, this association is suggestive of a complementary relationship between local 
R&D and imported  technology, since affiliates of  multinational  firms headquartered in R&D- 
intensive countries probably face lower real costs of importing technology than do affiliates of 
firms from other countries. But differences in the technological intensities of  parent firms also 
reflect heterogeneity between affiliates that can invalidate such an inference. 235  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Firms 
Information is available from the National Science Foundation (1  992) on 
the R&D intensities of  a large number of countries. The National  Science 
Foundation constructs indices that reflect national R&D/GNP ratios; because 
of  data limitations, these ratios are not all calculated using data for the same 
year, though most observations represent the period 1986-88.18 In the empiri- 
cal work that follows, the variables that influence R&D demand are interacted 
with these country-level measures of R&D intensity. This procedure represents 
a simple, if rather unsubtle, adjustment for heterogeneity among countries in 
the extent to which their firms undertake R&D. Local R&D intensity can have 
an important impact on the demand for imported technology as well, so the 
R&D intensity variable appears in the royalty equations. Since R&D intensity 
is likely to have a less direct impact on royalties than it does on R&D expendi- 
tures, the R&D intensity variable enters the royalty equations independent of 
the other explanatory variables. 
Information on tax systems and tax rates is reported by  Price Waterhouse 
(various issues). In the empirical work that follows, firms are assumed to face 
effective tax rates on their technology-related activities equal to statutory cor- 
porate tax rates in host countries. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 report means and standard 
deviations of the variables used in the empirical work. 
8.5  Foreign Affiliates of American Multinational Corporations 
The  model  described by  equations  (1)-(6)  carries  the  implication that 
technology-related royalty payments and R&D spending levels should respond 
to local tax rates. Specifically, the model predicts that higher withholding taxes 
on royalties will reduce royalty payments both  by  discouraging technology 
transfers and by reducing the ratio of reported royalties to the values of techno- 
logies transferred. 
The regressions reported in table 8.5 test these implications on the data that 
describe the behavior of the foreign affiliates of American multinational corpo- 
rations for the year 1989. Table 8.5 presents estimates of the coefficients that 
correspond to the implied specification of the royalty demand equation that 
emerges from equations (3) and (5). The dependent variable is a ratio, the 
numerator of which is royalties paid by the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms to 
their parent companies, and the denominator of  which is total sales by  the 
affiliatesi9  Data represent country aggregates. 
18. R&D/GNP ratios change little from year to year, as evidenced by  the time-series data on 
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States presented in table 8.2. These 
economies, which are among the most R&D intensive in the world, exhibit only gradual move- 
ments in  R&D intensity relative to each other. This pattern  suggests that time-invariant cross- 
sectional differences in R&D intensity are likely to be much more important than any differences 
created by the asynchronous nature of the data reported by the National Science Foundation. 
19. The equations  reported in  table 8.5 were all rerun using total royalties paid in  place of 
royalties paid to U.S.  parents, with very similar results (and not surprisingly, since, as table 8.1 
indicates, 80 percent of  all royalties paid by  the foreign affiliates of American firms go to the 
parent companies of the affiliates paying the royalties). The regressions reported in table 8.5 use 236  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 8.2  R&D Expenditure as a Percentage of GNP, 1961-89 
West  United  United 










































































































































































Source: National Science Foundation (1991). 
Note: French data are based on gross domestic product (GDP); consequently, percentages may be 
slightly overstated compared to GNP. Omissions (-)  indicate that R&D data are unavilable. 
The estimates reported in column (1) of  table 8.5 imply that royalty pay- 
ments respond negatively  to royalty tax rates and are close to unaffected by 
statutory tax rates. The coefficients indicate that, at a statutory tax rate of  35 
percent, a 10 percent reduction in the withholding tax rate on royalties stimu- 
lates additional royalty payments equal to 0.1 percent of  sales. The implied 
elasticity of  royalty payments with respect to the royalty tax rate, calculated 
using these estimates and mean values of  the variables as reported in table 8.3, 
royalties paid to  parent companies because only for those royalties is it clear at  what rate the 
royalties will be taxed. 237  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Firms 
Table 8.3  Variable Means and Standard Deviations: Foreign Affiliates of U.S. 
Corporations, 1989 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  N 
Parent royalties/Sales 
R&D/Labor compensation 
R&D for affiliateRota1 R&D 
R&D/GDP 
W*/(l -  T*) 
T*/(  1 -  T*) 
(W* -  T*)/1  -  T*) 
[(W* -  T*)/(  1  T*)]’ 
1/(1 -  T*) 
W* 
T* 
[w*/( I -  T*)](R&D/GNP) 
[T*/( 1 -  T*)](R&D/GNP) 
[(w* -  T*)/(I -  T*)](R&D/GNP) 
[(w* -  ~*)/(1  -  T*)]’(R&D/GNP) 

















































Note: The regressions reported  in  tables 8.5-8.7  use these variables. The first three represent 
country-level aggregate activities of foreign affiliates of U.S.  corporations in 1989, as reported in 
U.S.  Department of Commerce (1992). The variable R&D/GNP represents country R&D/GNP 
ratios reported by the National Science Foundation (1991).  The variable T*  represents local statu- 
tory corporate tax rates, and w* represents withholding tax rates imposed by foreign countries on 
royalty payments to the  United States. Observations are country-level aggregates of the behavior 
of all US.-owned affiliates. 
Table 8.4  Variable Means and Standard Deviations: Foreign-Owned  Affiliates 
in the United States, 1987 
Variable 
~~ 





w(l -  FTC) 
W2 
wy1 -  mc) 
w(R&D/GNF’) 
w(l -  RC)(R&D/GNP) 
w2(R&D/GNP) 


































Nore; The regressions reported in tables 8.8 and 8.9 use these variables. The first two variables 
represent country-level aggregate activities of  foreign-owned  affiliates in the United States in 
1987, as reported in U.S.  Department of  Commerce (1990). The variable R&D/GNP represents 
country R&D/GNP ratios reported by  the National  Science Foundation (1991). The variable w 
represents the withholding tax rate imposed by  the United States on royalty payments from the 
United States. The variable FTC equals unity if an investor’s home country taxes worldwide in- 
come and grants foreign tax credits to its residents, and equals zero otherwise. Observations are 
country-level aggregates of the behavior of all US.-owned affiliates. 238  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 8.5  Royalty Tax Rates and Royalty Payments by Foreign Affiliates of 
US.  Corporations, 1989 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant 
R&D/GNP 
W*/( 1 -  T*) 
T*/(  1 -  T*) 
(W* -  T*)/(  1 -  T*) 
[(W*  T*)/(l -  ‘?*)I’ 
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~  ~~  ~~  ~~  ~ 
Nore: The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the ratio of royalties paid by  foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations to  their parent companies to 
the affiliates’ total sales. The variable R&D/GNP represents country R&D/GNP ratios reported by 
the National Science Foundation (1991). The variable T* represents local statutory corporate tax 
rates, and w*  represents withholding tax rates imposed by foreign countries on royalty payments 
to the United States. Observations are country-level aggregates of  the behavior of  all US.-owned 
affiliates. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
is approximately -0.4.20 If sales are unaffected by changes in royalty tax rates, 
then this figure implies that doubling the royalty tax rate reduces royalties by 
40 percent, a sizable fraction. 
Since sales may respond to tax rate changes, this calculation may understate 
the responsiveness of royalties, but nevertheless strongly suggests that the true 
elasticity lies between zero and -  1. It is, however, important to note that the 
aggregate nature of  the data may introduce considerable measurement error 
that biases the estimated coefficient toward zero. The sign of  any bias intro- 
duced by omitted variables is ambiguous, though the magnitude could be large. 
The results presented in column (2) of table 8.5 indicate that royalties also 
respond significantly to differences between royalty withholding tax rates and 
statutory tax rates. As predicted, the local R&D/GNP ratio is positively corre- 
lated  with royalty payments. Alternative  specifications  reported  in columns 
(3)-(5) of table 8.5 yield similar conclusions: high tax rates on royalties are 
associated with lower ratios of royalty payments to total sales. 
20. Exercises such as this one are fraught with dangers, since variables may exhibit considerable 
differences between their conditional and unconditional means. The calculation in the text is meant 
only to be illustrative. 239  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Finns 
The specifications used to obtain the results described in table 8.5 were 
changed in a number of  ways, in every case generating similar results. One 
specification issue concerns the appropriate choice of denominator for the de- 
pendent variable. Specifications in which labor compensation replaces sales as 
the denominator of the dependent variable yield results that are almost identi- 
cal to those reported in table 8.5. Due to the somewhat heterogeneous nature 
of royalties, it seems most appropriate to scale this variable by  sales. In the 
regressions reported in tables 8.6 and 8.9, the dependent variables that repre- 
sent R&D expenditures are scaled by  labor compensation in manufacturing for 
somewhat  different reasons. Manufacturing affiliates account for  approxi- 
mately 90 percent of the R&D activity of foreign-owned affiliates in the U.S. 
and of the foreign affiliates of US.  firms. Labor expenditures share with R&D 
expenditures the feature of immediate deductibility for tax purposes2' and are 
more reasonably thought of as the product of firm choices than are sales, which 
may be functions of  R&D. All of  the R&D demand equations in reported in 
tables 8.6 and 8.9 were rerun scaling the dependent variable by labor expendi- 
tures, with results that are very similar to those reported in the tables. 
8.5.1 
The results reported in table 8.5 indicate that royalty payments by the foreign 
affiliates of U.S. multinational firms respond to tax rates in the predicted man- 
ner. The model described in equations (1)-(6) does not, however, carry a pre- 
diction about the sign of the effect of tax rates on R&D expenditure levels, and 
the object of the regressions reported in tables 8.6 and 8.7 is to measure the 
sign of any effect that may be present. The regressions reported in tables 8.6 
and 8.7 address this measurement problem using very different methodolo- 
gies-though,  as it happens, the results point to conclusions that are quite 
similar. 
Table 8.6 presents regressions that estimate of  the impact of the tax treat- 
ment of  royalties on the R&D intensities of  foreign affiliates of  U.S. firms, 
using specifications drawn from the model described in equations (1)-(6). The 
dependent variable is the ratio of R&D expenditures in 1989 to manufacturing 
labor compensation in 1989. The results in the table are strongly suggestive of 
an important impact of royalty taxes on R&D activity, but not all of the esti- 
mated coefficients in the table are significant. The strongest and most parsimo- 
nious specification is presented in column (2) of  table 8.6, and here the esti- 
mated  coefficients suggest that  an  unfavorable tax  climate for royalties  is 
associated with greater R&D activity. Imported technology and local R&D 
appear to be substitutes. 
A First Approach to Estimating the Impact of Taxes on R&D 
21. Of course, some countries (including the United States) offer tax credits and other induce- 
ments to  firms that perform R&D (and in some cases to firms that hire labor). A brief survey of 
country practices indicates, however, that sizable R&D subsidies are rare (e.g., see Hall 1993 for 
an analysis of  the magnitude of the marginal subsidy provided R&D in the United States by the 
research and experimentation tax credit), and that the primary subsidy comes from the immediate 
deductibility  of R&D expenses that almost all industrialized countries provide. 240  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 8.6  Local Tax Rates and R&D Intensities of Foreign Affiliates of U.S. 
Corporations, 1989 
~  ~~~  ~~ 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  -0.0260  -0.0274  -0.0260  -0.0208  -0.0209 
(0.0  146)  (0.0  150)  (0.0  146)  (0.0  146)  (0.0  147) 
(2.0237)  (1.8161)  (3.4801)  (1.7744)  (4.7042) 
3.1769 
(2.1870) 
-  5.8209 
(2.3508) 
R&D/GNP  10.0631  8.8330  12.7071  8.0861  8.5018 
[w*/(l -  T*)]  . (R&D/GNP) 
[T*/(  1 -  T*)]  . (R&D/GNP) 
[(w* -  ~*)/(1 -  T*)]  .  (R&D/GNP)  4.2941  3.1769  0.3143  0.3981 
[(w*  -  ~*)/(1 -  T*)]’.  (R&D/ 
(2.0724)  (2.1870)  (2.9011)  (3.0308) 
GNP)  -4.4628  -4.2460 
[U(l -  T*)]  . (R&D/GNP)  -2.6440  -2.2590 
6  0.0497  0.0509  0.0497  0.0487  0.0487 
log L  47.1507  46.3131  47.1507  47.9522  47.9568 
N  43  43  43  43  43 
Note: The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio 
of  R&D expenditures by  foreign affiliates of  U.S. corporations to the affiliates’ expenditures on labor 
compensation in manufcturing. The variable R&D/GNP represents country R&D/GNP ratios reported by 
the National Science Foundation (1991).  The variable T* represents local statutory corporate tax rates, and 
w* represents withholding tax rates imposed by foreign countries on royalty payments to the United States. 
Observations are country-level aggregates of the behavior of all U.S.-owned affiliates. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
(2.417  I )  (3.3  159) 
(2.0200)  (2.7  136) 
(0.0062)  (0.0063)  (0.0062)  (0.0060)  (0.0060) 
Columns (3)-(5) of  table 8.6 report the results of  alternative specifications 
of the model. Two aspects of these results are noteworthy. The first is that the 
estimated coefficients on the variable [l/(l -  7*)]  *  (R&D/GNP) are always 
insignificant. This variable appears as one part of the first term on the right- 
hand side of equation (3,  and the estimated coefficient captures the effect of 
c, the cost of  developing technology at home to transfer to affiliates abroad. 
The insignificance of the estimated coefficient implies either that firms transfer 
nonrival technologies to their affiliates, so c = 0, or that the estimating method- 
ology is not powerful enough to identify an important effect. The second note- 
worthy aspect of the results is that the specifications that include quadratic tax 
terms generate insignificant results. These results may reflect the limited abil- 
ity of the estimators to distinguish the effects of collinear variables in a small 
sample. 
Using the coefficient estimate from the equation presented in column (1) of 
table 8.6, the implied elasticity of R&D activity with respect to the withholding 
tax rate on royalties (evaluating all variables at their sample means) is approxi- 
mately 0.16. This figure is smaller than the implied royalty elasticity calculated 241  Taxes,  Technology  Transfer, and  R&D by Multinational Firms 
from table 8.5, which is reassuring because own-price elasticities are usually 
stronger than cross-price elasticities. This estimated elasticity suggests that lo- 
cal R&D is a mild substitute for imported technology, but it is helpful to con- 
sider additional evidence before drawing any conclusions. 
8.5.2  A Second Approach to Estimating the Impact of Taxes on R&D 
One difficulty that arises in estimating the impact of  royalty tax rates on 
local R&D levels is that many omitted variables influence R&D spending. It 
is possible that these variables are correlated with royalty withholding tax rates 
in a way  that biases the estimated tax rate coefficients and generates a mis- 
leading conclusion concerning the substitutability of R&D for imported tech- 
nology. The regressions reported in table 8.6 control for local technological 
environments simply by  interacting the  tax  variables with  the  R&D/GNP 
measure. 
An alternative approach is to use available information that distinguishes the 
R&D activity of foreign affiliates of American firms for their own purposes 
from R&D activity that they undertake on behalf of others. Both types of R&D 
activity are likely to be influenced by local economic and technological condi- 
tions. It is, however, possible that the latter type of contract-style R&D per- 
formed for others is generally unaffected by the availability of technology im- 
ports from parent firms. If  not, then R&D performed for others serves as a 
control group with which to compare R&D performed by  affiliates for their 
own purposes. Under the hypothesis that R&D performed for others is unaf- 
fected by  technology imports, the fraction of an affiliate’s total R&D activity 
undertaken for itself is a positive function of royalty taxes if local R&D and 
imported technology are substitutes, and a negative function of royalty taxes if 
local R&D and imported technology are complements. 
There are 38 countries in the sample for which the BEA data distinguish 
R&D performed by affiliates for themselves from R&D performed by affiliates 
for others. Table 8.7 presents estimated coefficients from regressions in which 
the dependent variable is the ratio of R&D performed by  affiliates for them- 
selves to total R&D by  affiliates. The results once again suggest that local 
R&D is a substitute for imported technology. In the regression reported in col- 
umn (1) of table 8.7, the estimated coefficient on royalty withholding tax rates 
is positive and significant; the same is true of the coefficient on the difference 
between withholding and statutory tax rates reported in column (2). The coef- 
ficient estimates reported in column (2) indicate that a 10 percent change in 
the difference between foreign withholding and statutory tax rates (normalized 
by  one minus the foreign statutory tax rate) is associated with a 2.6 percent 
change in the intensity of R&D activity by  affiliates for themselves. 
Columns (3)-(5) of table 8.7 report the results of  alternative specifications 
of the R&D demand equation. The coefficient estimates from these specifica- 
tions are consistent with those reported in columns (1) and (2) and are also 
consistent with the results reported in table 8.6. In particular, the estimated 242  James R.  Hines, Jr. 
Table 8.7  Local Tax Rates and the Own-Intensity of R&D by Foreign Affiliates 
of U.S. Corporations, 1989 
Variable 
Constant 
W*/( 1 -  T*) 
T*/( 1 -  T*) 
(W* -  T*)/(l  -  T*) 
W* 
T* 
[(W* -  T*)/(1 -  T*)]’ 
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0.2527  0.2550 
(0.0435)  (0.0439) 
-12.1006  -12.5287 













Note: The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the ratio of R&D expenditures by foreign affiliates of U.S.  corporations for their own use to the 
affiliates’ total R&D expenditures. The variable T*  represents local statutory corporate tax rates, 
and w*  represents withholding tax rates imposed by foreign countries on royalty payments to the 
United States. Observations are country-level aggregates of the behavior of all US.-owned affili- 
ates. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
coefficient of the variable 1/(1 -  T*)  is again insignificant. The estimates re- 
ported in column (1) of  table 8.7 imply that the elasticity of  R&D spending 
with respect to royalty withholding taxes (evaluating all variables at their sam- 
ple means) is approximately 0.11,  which resembles the elasticity calculated 
from estimates reported in table 8.6. 
The regressions reported in tables 8.6 and 8.7 offer consistent evidence that 
the aggregate behavior of the foreign affiliates of American multinational firms 
exhibits substitution of local R&D for imported technology. It is important to 
note, however, that there can be more than one interpretation of this pattern at 
the level of individual firms. One possibility is that tax differences influence 
the behavior of firms located in different countries. A second possibility is that 
tax differences encourage specific firms to locate in certain countries and not 
in others, without influencing the R&D intensities of individual firm~.~~A  third, 
22. Lipsey et al. (1990) examine the impact of host country characteristics on the attributes- 
particularly R&D intensities-of  multinational firms choosing to locate within the country. They 
do not, however, consider the impact of tax policies. 243  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Firms 
and perhaps the most likely, possibility represents some combination of  the 
first two. The use of aggregate data makes it impossible to use the observed 
pattern of  behavior to distinguish these explanations; however, for many pur- 
poses, it may not be necessary to distinguish them. 
8.6  Foreign-Owned  Affiliates in the United States 
The behavior of foreign-owned affiliates in the United States offers addi- 
tional evidence on the responsiveness of R&D activity to royalty tax rates. This 
evidence must, however, be interpreted with caution, owing to heterogeneous 
circumstances of  foreign firms that invest in the United States and the small 
sample size of 27 foreign countries for which sufficient data are available. 
Home country tax treatments of foreign multinational firms that invest in the 
United States differ according to individual circumstances and national law. 
There are two dimensions along which the variation between investors is most 
important. The home governments of some foreign investors tax the worldwide 
incomes of their residents while granting credits for foreign taxes paid, while 
other governments exempt all foreign-source income from tax.23  A second di- 
mension along which tax systems differ concerns the degree of integration of 
personal  and  corporate taxes. For  some  countries, their corporation taxes 
largely represent advanced withholding taxes against personal tax liabilities. 
The  specification of  royalty  equations corresponding to  the  system de- 
scribed by equations (1)-(6) is somewhat different in the case of foreign invest- 
ors in the United States than it is in the regressions reported in table 8.5. To 
start, the tax rate T*  is the U.S. tax rate, which is the same for all foreign 
investors. The value of  c,  the cost of producing technology for export, need 
not be similar for different foreign investors and is captured in the estimating 
equations by the inclusion of R&D/GNP as an explanatory variable. And there 
may be important differences between the incentives facing investors from for- 
eign tax credit countries and those facing investors from countries that do not 
grant foreign tax credits. 
Table 8.8 presents estimates of  the determinants of  royalty payments by 
foreign-owned affiliates in the United States in 1987. The coefficient on the 
withholding tax rate in the regression presented in the column (2) of table 8.8 
implies that raising the tax rate by  10 percent reduces the royalty/sales ratio 
by  0.74 percent. The estimated coefficient lies just at the margin of  statistical 
significance. To understand its magnitude in a different way, the implied elas- 
ticity of royalties/sales, evaluating all variables at their population means, is 
approximately -0.12.  If  sales are unaffected by  changes in royalty tax rates, 
then this figure implies that doubling the royalty tax rates reduces royalties by 
12 percent. 
23. Of  course, this dichotomous breakdown greatly oversimplifies the many distinctions and 
subtleties that foreign tax systems exhibit. 244  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 8.8  Royalty Tax Rates and Royalty Payments by Foreign-Owned 
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Nore: The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the ratio of  royalties paid by  foreign-owned affiliates to the affiliates’ total U.S. sales in  1987. 
The variable R&D/GNP represents country R&D/GNP ratios reported by  the National Science 
Foundation (1991). The variable w represents  the withholding tax  rate  imposed by  the United 
States on royalty payments from the United States. The variable FTC equals unity if an investor’s 
home country taxes worldwide income and grants foreign tax credits to its residents, and equals 
zero otherwise. Observations are countrylevel aggregates of the behavior of  all foreign-owned 
affiliates. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Column (3) of table 8.8 presents the same regression in which the withhold- 
ing tax rate is now transformed to be zero for all investors from foreign tax 
credit countries. The results are very similar to those reported in column (2). 
Columns (4) and (5) report results of regressions in which squares of the with- 
holding tax rates are introduced; the coefficient estimates are insignificant, re- 
flecting the  multicollinearity  of  the  two  tax  rate  variables  and the  limited 
amount of variation in a sample of this size. 
Table 8.9 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that investigate 
the correlation between the R&D intensity of foreign-owned affiliates in the 
United States and the tax variables that influence the cost of imported technol- 
ogy. One striking feature of all of the regressions presented in table 8.9 is the 
strong correlation between the R&D intensity of  foreign-owned  affiliates  in 
the United States and the R&D intensity of the countries in which their parent 
firms are located. Column (2) presents the simplest specification that includes 
tax  rate  variables;  the  estimated  coefficient on the  interaction between  the 
withholding tax rate and home country R&D intensity is positive and signifi- 
cant. The implied elasticity of R&D with respect to the cost of imported tech- 
nology (evaluated at sample means) is approximately 0.3. This is a very sizable 245  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Firms 
Table 8.9  Royalty Tax Rates and R&D Intensities of Foreign-Owned  Affiliates in the 
United States, 1987 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  -0.1844  -0.1716  -0.1345  -0.1625  -0.1387 
R&D/GNP  14.6146  12.1191  10.5524  12.2114  10.6242 
w(R&D/GNP)  30.8403  -5.6039 
w(l -  FTC).(R&D/GNP)  45.4557  72.9530 
(10.0257)  (63.4897) 
w2(R&D/GNP)  128.6451 
(142.4354) 
(0.0697)  (0.0565)  (0.0456)  (0.0547)  (0.0472) 
(3.5479)  (2.9640)  (2.3883)  (2.8594)  (2.4134) 
(1 1.9 140)  (42.1940) 
w’( 1 -  FTC).(R&D/GNP)  -93.2700 
(212.7782) 
a  0.1335  0.1094  0.0891  0.1060  0.0892 
(0.0225)  (0.0190)  (0.0153)  (0.0185)  (0.0154) 
log L  6.7117  9.2883  13.0824  9.6807  13.1794 
N  27  27  27  27  27 
Note: The columns report coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio 
of the U.S. R&D expenditures of foreign-owned affiliates to the affiliates’ total U.S.  manufacturing labor 
compensation in 1987. The variable R&D/GNP represents country R&D/GNP ratios reported by the Na- 
tional Science Foundation (1991). The variable w represents the withholding tax rate imposed by  the 
United States on royalty payments from the United States. The variable FTC equals unity if an investor’s 
home country taxes worldwide income and grants foreign tax credits to  its residents, and equals zero 
otherwise. Observations are country-level aggregates of the behavior of all foreign-owned affiliates. Stan- 
dard errors are in parentheses. 
elasticity, particularly in view of  the smaller own-price elasticity of royalties 
implied by the estimates reported in table 8.8. Furthermore, the responsiveness 
of  royalties to withholding tax rates reflects changes in reporting behavior in 
addition to changes in amounts of technology transferred. The elasticity im- 
plies that, in the absence of  an effect arising through the scale of operations, 
doubling the withholding tax rate raises R&D expenditures by 30 percent. This 
estimated response magnitude is very large and may reflect the imprecision of 
estimates drawn from so small a sample. Nevertheless, it is striking that the 
pattern of substitutability between R&D and imported technology appears for 
foreign investors in the United States as well as for American investors in 
other countries.24 
Column (3) of  table 8.9 presents estimates from the specification in which 
the withholding tax rate is interacted with a variable that equals zero if  the 
investor’s parent company is located in a foreign tax credit country, and equals 
24. Unfortunately, BEA does not require foreign-owned firms in the United States to distinguish 
the R&D they  perform for their own  use from R&D that they perform for others, so it is not 
possible to estimate equations of the type reported in table 8.7 for foreign investors in the United 
States  . 246  James R. Hines, Jr. 
one otherwise. The results are qualitatively very similar to those presented in 
column (2),  with the difference that the estimated R&D appears in this speci- 
fication to be even more responsive to withholding tax rates. Columns (4)  and 
(5) present  regression results for specifications that include quadratic with- 
holding tax rate terms, which again exhibit symptoms of multicollinearity. 
Evidence on the behavior of foreign owned affiliates in the United States 
suggests conclusions that are very similar to those that emerge from the behav- 
ior of the foreign affiliates of American corporations. Foreign investors in the 
United  States pay fewer royalties, and use more R&D-intensive operations, 
when facing higher tax rates on royalties paid to their home countries. The 
restricted  size of the sample of investing foreign countries makes statistical 
inference difficult, but the estimated coefficients indicate a responsiveness that 
is somewhat greater than that for the foreign affiliates of American corpora- 
tions. 
8.7  Conclusion 
This paper uses information on the behavior of the foreign affiliates of U.S. 
firms and foreign-owned affiliates in the United States to estimate the relation- 
ship between technology imports and local R&D. The idea is to use the tax 
treatment of royalty payments to identify the degree of substitutability between 
these sources of technology. Evidence from the actions of American and for- 
eign firms indicates that R&D expenditures respond to local tax rates, and that 
technology imports and local R&D are substitutes. The substitutability of these 
two sources of technology carries numerous implications for the impact of tax 
policy on R&D activity, particularly when contrasted with the complementar- 
ity that is sometimes thought to characterize their relationship. 
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Comment  Adam B. Jaffe 
This paper examines the effect of the tax treatment of royalties paid by foreign 
affiliates for the use of their parents’  technology both on the  magnitude of 
such royalties paid  and on the expenditures by the affiliates on research and 
development (R&D). The paper finds that royalty payments do respond nega- 
tively to tax rates, and that affiliate R&D is increased by higher taxes on royalt- 
ies, which implies that affiliate R&D and imported technology from the corpo- 
rate parent are substitutes rather than complements in generating net revenues 
for the affiliate. The first result is probably satisfying to tax economists, but is 
of limited significance because we cannot tell how much of  the effect corre- 
sponds to changes in the use of technology and how much represents changes 
in the valuation of technology for royalty tax purposes. The second result, how- 
ever, is a provocative one that is contrary to most people’s prior beliefs. If it is 
true that affiliate R&D is a substitute for parent technology, this would have 
important implications for understanding  multinational  corporations and for 
the design of  domestic policy. My comment will address why  this result is 
significant, and then go on to consider how convincing the paper is about the 
complementarity question. 
Significance of the Result 
There are a number of reasons why we care about whether parent and affili- 
ate R&D are complements or substitutes. First, there is the important industrial 
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organization question of  how companies decide whether to start operations 
overseas, and what the role of R&D is in that process. A standard view of why 
companies engage in overseas investment is that they have intangible assets, 
such as technology, that are at least partially nonrival across countries, but 
that it is difficult to capture the returns to these assets through arm’s-length 
transactions such as technology licenses. Hence, establishing overseas opera- 
tions captures quasi rents to these assets that would otherwise be lost. A puzzle 
within this view is why companies would then engage in research at the affili- 
ate location. A potential answer to this puzzle is that such research is comple- 
mentary to the home research, either because it is more easily focused on spe- 
cific conditions of  the host-country market (or input markets) or because local 
R&D allows the parent to benefit from spillovers from the R&D performed in 
the host country. If parent and affiliate research are not complements, then the 
puzzle of why affiliates do research reappears.’ 
The second reason why complementarity matters is that governments may 
wish to encourage R&D within their borders because of a belief that R&D 
generates positive externalities.  As Hines discusses, the tax treatment of royalty 
payments might be an instrument to encourage local R&D, but the instrument 
can only be used if we know whether raising the cost of “buying” technology 
from the parent company increases or decreases the incentive to do R&D lo- 
cally, that is, whether affiliate and parent technology are complements or sub- 
stitutes. 
This policy conundrum is, however, actually more complicated than simply 
asking whether raising the cost of importing technology stimulates or inhibits 
local R&D. If the location of R&D matters at all, it has to be the case that R&D 
spillovers are geographically localized, that is, that technology developed at 
home creates greater external benefits for domestic firms than does technology 
developed abroad.* This implies that domestic firms are not fully benefiting 
from technology developed in other countries. It is plausible that the importa- 
tion of that technology for use by an affiliate might bring with it the spillovers 
that otherwise would not be readily available to domestic firms. Thus, there is 
a crucial policy question that is logically prior to the question of whether taxing 
technology imports encourages or discourages local R&D. That is: Which cre- 
ates more local externalities, the import of technology from abroad or the pro- 
duction of  technology at home? This would seem to turn on the question of 
whether the spillovers are generated by the process of the creation of technol- 
ogy or by  its use. Both the theoretical and empirical literature on spillovers 
appears to be silent on this question, largely because creation and use are typi- 
cally thought of as occurring in the same place. 
1. I return to this issue below. 
2. As the paper mentions, the primary analytical justification for policies to encourage R&D is 
the belief that R&D generates positive externalities to other firms. If such externalities are not 
geographically localized, then they cannot be a source of differences in growth rates across coun- 
tries and policymakers should not care whether R&D is done at home or abroad. See Jaffe, Hen- 
derson, and Trajtenberg (1993) for evidence on the extent of geographic localization of research 
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An interesting observation derives from the combination of the results that 
affiliate  and parent R&D are  substitutes, while parent  R&D appears to be 
“free,” that is, sufficiently nonrival across countries that the incremental cost 
of using parent technology in another affiliate is zero (table 8.6 and related 
discussion). If both results are correct, then, in the absence of tax distortions, 
it seems unlikely that affiliates would do R&D (since affiliate R&D is merely 
a substitute for something that is free). In the presence of  taxes, this result 
no longer holds. It is possible that affiliates would choose to perform what is 
essentially duplicative R&D, merely to avoid paying withholding taxes on the 
transfer of the parent’s already created knowledge. This result might appear to 
be highly wasteful from a social point of view, but that is unclear given that 
the affiliate’s R&D will generate spillovers. 
Convincingness of the Result on Complementarity 
Within the confines of  the paper itself, the finding that affiliate and parent 
R&D appear to be substitutes is quite robust. The paper takes three distinct 
cuts at the issue: it shows that foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations do more 
R&D in countries with high withholding rates (table 8.6), that affiliates of for- 
eign corporations do more R&D in the United States if their parents are in 
countries whose tax treaties with the United States result in higher withholding 
rates on royalties emanating from the United States (table 8.9), and that foreign 
affiliates (of U.S. corporations) that operate in high-withholding-rate countries 
have a higherfraction of their R&D that is for their own purposes rather than 
for contract research (table 8.7). 
I do have reservations about two aspects of these results. First, as the paper 
points out, the effect of the withholding rate on the U.S. R&D of foreign firms 
is implausibly large, suggesting that affiliate R&D responds more to the royalty 
tax rate than do the royalties themselves, despite the fact that the royalty effect 
is the sum of a real effect and an effect from the incentive to undervalue tech- 
nology to reduce the tax. This suggests that some kind of spurious correlation 
may be at work. 
My second reservation derives from the fact that in table 8.6 and table 8.9 
(though noc in table 8.7) the royalty tax effect is estimated from the interaction 
of the withholding tax rate variable with the R&D intensity of the host country 
(in the case of foreign affiliates of U.S. firms) or the parent country (in the case 
of U.S. affiliates of foreign firms). This interaction is motivated by the need to 
allow for the effects of unobserved differences in the R&D incentives in differ- 
ent countries. Such differences are likely to be important, and the interaction 
effect is plausible. It is also the case, however, that the R&D/GNP variables 
are extremely significant on their own in both tables 8.6 and 8.9. It is very 
likely that the effects of R&D intensity, even ignoring any tax effects, are non- 
linear and vary depending on economic and institutional features of the coun- 
tries involved. This makes it hard to know for sure whether the coefficient on 
the interaction term is really picking up the effect attributed to it by the model, 251  Taxes, Technology Transfer, and R&D by Multinational Firms 
or whether it is simply picking up additional aspects of  the R&D intensity 
effect . 
Overall, whether these results are convincing depends on one’s prior belief 
regarding the complementarity of affiliate R&D and imported technology from 
the parent. I have a strong prior that they are complements. First, analyses of 
the relationship between different kinds of R&D in other settings have gener- 
ally found complementarity. Jaffe (1986) shows that spillovers from the R&D 
of  a technologically related firm can increase another firm’s patents, profits, 
and market value, but the effectiveness of such spillovers is itself a function of 
how much R&D the spillover-receiving firm performs. That is, firms’ own 
R&D and spillovers from other firms are complements in  the generation of 
economically useful new  knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) find that 
firms must undertake their own R&D in order to learn about research results 
produced elsewhere, again suggesting complementarity. Though it is possible 
that the affiliate and parent R&D combine in a way  that is wholly different 
from how knowledge inside and outside the firm combine, it is unclear why 
this should be so. 
A second reason to expect complementarity is that affiliate R&D ought to 
facilitate the absorption of locally generated R&D spillovers from other firms. 
If  it is true that R&D spillovers are geographically localized, then one reason 
to enter a foreign country (particularly an R&D-intensive one such as the 
United States) would be to absorb its R&D spillovers. If Cohen and Levinthal 
are right and you have to do your own R&D to absorb spillovers, it seems likely 
that you have to have a local R&D presence to benefit from local spillovers. To 
the extent that such spillovers are complements with own R&D, then own local 
R&D ought to be complementary with parent R&D. 
Finally, Hines’s paper itself contains results that seem to suggest comple- 
mentarity. Among firms in the United States that are foreign owned, the strong- 
est predictor of R&D intensity is the R&D intensity of their parent countries. 
The paper explains this as reflecting differences in the nature of the firms es- 
tablished here by parents from different origins, and this is plausible. But it 
also can be interpreted as saying that firms whose parents have a strong tech- 
nology base do more R&D here, which would suggest complementarity. 
One possibility is that  these complementarity effects are masked  in  the 
country aggregates. It could be that, for any given firm, affiliate and parent 
R&D are substitutes for some values of  affiliate R&D and complements for 
others. For example, it seems plausible that some small scale of  affiliate re- 
search is necessary to combine what the parent knows with locally available 
knowledge about both supply-side factors (e.g., the characteristics of locally 
available inputs) and demand-side factors (local tastes and availability of com- 
plementary products). Beyond this small scale, perhaps incremental affiliate 
R&D is merely a substitute for parent technology. If this is true, we could find 
that the country aggregates act like substitutes despite features of complemen- 
tarity at the micro level. 252  James R. Hines, Jr. 
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